Abstract: The paper analyzes the conditions of civic participation that are elucidated by criticism of the deficits of public reason. The interpretation proceeds in three steps. First, the idea of public reason and discourse is analyzed, followed by an explanation of democratic deficit and of the social deficit in the second and third steps, respectively. These deficits are analyzed as an essential limit to political and social conditions of the participation of citizens. The analysis focuses thereby on the theory of public reason by one of the most influential political philosophers of the last decades, John Rawls. The paper identifies two main pitfalls in his theory: first, the deficit following from an inadequate integration of an individual into society, which, in this case, represents democratic deficit, second, the deficit linked with underrating the socio-distributive dimension of justice, which means a social deficit.
The significance of the public sphere for the democratic system and civic participation can hardly be overvalued. Similarly, within the framework of the public sphere, the essential role of public reason, or more generally speaking, public discourse as a kind of organizing component of the public sphere, cannot be overlooked. John Rawls, whose theory will be central to my article, assigns a privileged position to public reason, as indicated in the following lines from his The Law of Peoples and The Idea of Public Reason Revisited: "Taken together, they represent the culmination of my reflections on how reasonable citizens and peoples might live together peacefully in a just world" (Rawls 1999, vi) . In other words, the elaboration of these topics represents a culmination in which Rawls consummates his reflections on international politics in the conception of the law of peoples and he completes his general ideas on the political system through the idea of public reason.
Although Rawls also outlines the role of public reason in the realm of international politics, he concentrates on its application at the national level within a western type country, i.e. a liberal democracy. This will be the focus of my article. In my critical approach to Rawls' theory of public reason I will concentrate on the conception of public reason that is placed within the liberal-democratic framework of one country. Nevertheless, I will argue as I did in my analysis of Rawls' conception of international relations (Hrubec 2004, 77-104) 1 ; that means 1 As for the content of Rawls' work, both his books A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism deal with the most reasonable legitimate conception of justice for liberally democratic society in a nation state; on the other hand, the task of The Law of Peoples is to re-define and extend these ideas with HUMAN AFFAIRS 18, 81-91, 2008 DOI: 10.2478 that I will try to show that there are two fundamental pitfalls in his theory: firstly, the deficit following from the inadequate integration of the individual into the community, which in this case is a democratic deficit and secondly, the deficit associated with underrating the sociodistributive dimension of justice, which is the social deficit. These deficits represent limits to the political and social conditions of civic participation. I argue that Rawls' conception of the public sphere is on the whole more demanding in normative terms than practical politics, but in principle it embodies a formulation which is an unproblematic complement of the programmes of political parties 2 and which reproduces the problems of political practice through the aforementioned deficits in a more moderate fashion. These deficits are also found amongst those that Nancy Fraser-independently of Rawls' work-links with current political theory and practical policy in her study Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy I would like to extend her analysis here.
With regard to the democratic deficit, Fraser draws attention to "the overly weak character of some public spheres in late-capitalist societies" or in current, so-called "actually existing democracy" that is not identical to democracy as such, just as so-called "actually existing socialism" was not equal to socialism (Fraser 1997, 93) . 3 Fraser draws upon the reformulated conception of the public sphere as a set of private persons coming together to build the public sphere. Placing emphasis on civic society, she therefore says-thus coming into conflict with Rawls' theory of public reason limited to public administration-that members of the public sphere are not just civil servants. 4 In her critique of social deficit, Fraser says that "an adequate conception of the public sphere requires not merely the bracketing but, rather, the elimination of social inequality." The task of critical theory in late-capitalist societies is to identify the deformations caused by social inequalities in the field of deliberation among individual publics (Fraser 1997, 92) .
I will proceed in three steps: first, I will give a general account of the idea of public reason and discourse; second, I will explain what the democratic deficit refers to; and third, I will elucidate the social deficit.
Public Discourse
Since Rawls' concept of public reason represents an influential interpretation, it was published several times and apologetically reproduced by many authors. This is why I shall confine myself to briefly summing up the main ideas.
The idea of public reason appeared explicitly for the first time in Rawls' second book Political Liberalism (Rawls 1993, 212-254; Rawls 1999, 131-180) . Since the characteristic feature of liberal democracy is reasonable pluralism, i.e. the reality of the pluralism of different moral, philosophical, and religious comprehensive doctrines-(e.g. ecological, Protestant or Catholic), according to Rawls, citizens realize that in solving basic political questions they cannot-on the basis of these comprehensive doctrines-hope to reach agreement (Rawls the aim of proposing basic lines of thought both for the foreign policy of this kind of regime within the reasonably acceptable just society of peoples and for a more general purpose-the possibility of a global society of liberal and decent peoples. 2 E.g. in the German Federal Republic. 3 Cf. also Fraser/Honneth (2003) ; Habermas (1989 Habermas ( ). 1999 . Such agreement, however, can be reached with the help of public reason. In the first approximation, public reason is defined as a method to be used by a political community to formulate its plans, determine the priority of its objectives and take its decisions (Rawls 1993, 212) . Rawls states that public reason relates to "'constitutional essentials' and questions of basic justice" (Rawls 1993, 214; in detail 227-230; Rawls 1999, 133) . In other words, The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government's relation to its citizens and their relation to one another" (Rawls 1999, 132 ).
Rawls binds public reason and public discourse together in the sense that the ideal of public reason dominates in public discourse, so that public reason has a controlling influence in public discourse (Rawls 1999, e.g. 215) . He is milder in his expressions elsewhere stating that public reasoning is a type of public discourse (Rawls 1999, e.g. 155) . Since my objective is to show that Rawls' idea of public reason is conceived too narrowly, there are two options on how to proceed in terms of terminology. We can insist on the concept of public reason and expand it or think about a broader approach using a different term.
5 I think the latter option is better as it would enable us to maintain the concept of public reason for Rawls' problematic standpoint and if possible, to reserve a concept of public discourse for a more adequate stance. The conception of public discourse has already been incorporated into a dialogical, communicative or deliberative tradition of thought, which I am building on.
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Before I start the analysis of the particular aspects of the idea of public reason, I would like to eliminate an often implicitly accepted idea that Rawls' concept of public reason is a good instrument for a critique of society and politics simply because it is normative. It is difficult to find any reason why normativity itself should be a guarantee of adequate criticism.
Although I think that Rawls' attitude is not sufficiently normative, I want also to underline the fact that even a scale of normativity itself is not a guarantee of meaningful criticism. The fact that the demands of the theory differ significantly from existing practice is not proof that the theory is a step in the right direction, nor that such criticism is desirable. Since criticism cannot be drawn merely from an ability to create an alternative to the real world by a vague and therefore widely accepted-although sufficiently critical-idea of another world, focusing on the serious problems emerging in society and in politics should be an indispensable part of fruitful social and political criticism. Criticism requires specification, and so in the interpretation of Rawls' theory of public reason, it is necessary to focus particularly on the two mentioned deficits: democratic and social.
Democratic Deficit
Rawls limits the theory of public discourse by his conception of public reason where he divides citizens into two categories. By establishing boundaries, limits or restrictions (Rawls 1993, 214-215) on his concept of public reason, he makes a rather sharp distinction between public and nonpublic use of reason. On the one hand, he rather unusually assigns the public dimension of reason only to government and related activities, like government statements, parliamentary discussions, discussions in legal proceedings, in political parties, including election campaigns and their evaluations by citizens in the single act of election. Persons who may use public reason are government officials and candidates for public offices (Rawls 1999, 133; c.f. Rawls 1993, § 1-3) . Their circle is specified by the so-called public political forum that includes "the discourse of judges in their decisions, and especially of the judges of a supreme court; the discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and finally, the discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers, especially in their public oratory, party platforms, and political statements" (Rawls 1999, 133-134) .
On the other hand, Rawls completely separates the so-called background culture or the culture of civic society, to which he does not assign the public dimension of reason, from the public political forum (Rawls 1999, 133-134; Rawls 1993, 14) . Within this culture he conceives of the nonpublic dimension of reason extensively in connection with discussions in different schools, especially at universities and in specialized schools, in scientific, professional and voluntary associations, churches and other associations of civil society. In this way he eliminates civic activities from public reason; citizens have no choice but to watch the performance of civil servants, or,-if they do not satisfy public reason-to try to remove them. This relationship between the two categories of citizens within the public discourse is of a non-communicative character because there is no dialogue between them about the various problems. Civil servants either perform their duties well or they can be removed from their offices.
Amongst the activities that Rawls regards as nonpublic are the media, which, in accordance with their name, become a mere mediator between the public political culture of civil servants and the culture of civil society (Rawls 1999, 134) . Rawls denotes all kinds of media (TV, radio, newspapers, etc.) as nonpublic political culture.
Further specification of Rawls' limitation on public reason can be achieved by investigating different controversial forms of discourse which Rawls does not include in public reason or he admits their inclusion but only if they support his idea of public reason (Rawls 1999, 155-156). 7 Generally speaking, it has primarily to do with reasoning which refers to comprehensive moral, philosophical and religious doctrines in different ways. The first of these kinds of discourse is declaration. We use declaration to inform others about our own comprehensive doctrines, whether secular or not. The purpose of such a declaration should not be to persuade others that our comprehensive doctrine is correct or that they ought to accept it. The intention is to show other people the way in which we arrive at a public political conception of justice which others share with us, in spite of the fact that they do not share our comprehensive doctrine. According to Rawls, this should strengthen civic friendship but must not lay claim to its belonging to public reason.
Another form of discourse that Rawls does not include in public reason is so-called conjecture, which can be seen to be the opposite of declaration. Conjecture is an effort to argue from the perspective of the comprehensive doctrines of others in order to persuade them from their own point of view that they can support the public political conception of the justice we are endorsing. This can strengthen public reason although it has a tendency to manipulate, especially if we do not notify others that the position we use as argument is not our own position.
Rawls adds to these two kinds of discourse another one, which he refers to as witnessing. This may occur in a just society with the support of all citizens when some citizens feel the need to express their disagreement concerning some institutions or their measures, e.g. Catholics against abortions. However, it is not sufficient to make other citizens familiar with such a disagreement, it is necessary to give evidence of their faith. However, such a form of discourse is not civil disobedience, which typically refers to the liberal political conception of justice.
Although it is not my intention to defend these forms of discourse excluded by Rawls, as fully valued elements of public discourse, I think that it is important to mention them at least for two reasons. Firstly, by presenting them, it helps us realize what forms of discourse would be included in public reason by the authors who defend the full integration of the arguments of different comprehensive doctrines, and thus take up a position opposite to that of Rawls. Against the background of this inclusion, it is possible to elucidate in a negative way that which Rawls understands by public reason.
The second reason is, however, more substantial. Thematizing these forms of discourse enables a whole spectrum of forms to be outlined. This can then be taken into account in an attempt to extend the conception of public reason limited to civil servants so as to include the activities of a wider range of participants. For instance, Jürgen Habermas thinks that it is not possible to marginalize unofficial arenas of the political public sphere (including the media), i.e. social movements, voluntary associations, and other areas of communication within civic society (Habermas 1995, 109-131; Rawls 1995, 132-180) .
8 These independent public forums that are not identical with state administration and economic systems are, to him, the essence of the sovereignty of the people. Thomas McCarthy offers an apt expression of Habermas' attitude in his discussion with Rawls, stating that in this conception of deliberative policy of different public arenas where a variety of issues relating to society are discussed in the presence of the cultural and political public sphere, it is the democratic self-government of citizens that plays a crucial role.
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The unofficial forum of citizens, i.e. the part of public discourse overlooked by Rawls, is an evident basis of the self-government of citizens, i.e. of democracy. The articulation and discussion of opinions in civic society represents a fundamental building block in shaping views of the political public sphere, without which it would be difficult to create democratic mechanisms in parliament, in the court of law, etc. Rawls' idea of public reason does not make such an articulation possible because his distinction relies on the opinions expressed almost exclusively within parliament, the court of law or in the political party spheres (cf. Gutmann 2003) .
To Rawls these arguments mean endorsing the view that policy must be anchored in a comprehensive doctrine; in the case of Habermas, it is in the comprehensive philosophy of communicative action and discourse. Although this interpretation might be considered more suitable for the cultural theory developed by Seyla Benhabib that ties up with Habermas (2002; cf. Benhabib 1996) , it would in fact be inadequate. Nonetheless, it contains a useful element that points to, in the concept of public reason, an attempt to go beyond the mere acceptability of opinions in the eyes of citizens; in other words, to go beyond particular arguments by universalistic justification. What is crucial for Rawls is only the general acceptability of the argument by other citizens; on the other hand, for Habermas, it is also the validity or real justification of this acceptability within the framework of idealized consensus, which, however, is rejected by Rawls as a boundary criterion of comprehensive doctrine. To sum up, Rawls' narrowly defined conception of public reason set limits on the democratic scope of the decision-making undertaken by citizens; nevertheless, within this narrow conception more room is left for decision-making which is not subject to the criterion of justification, to a selected group of people-certain civil servants.
Rawls' motivation for this authoritative conception of public reason is an effort to maintain social stability. According to Rawls, we reflect the fact of reasonable pluralism and we are aware that some of the reasons we would like to endorse will be unacceptable to some citizens:
We seek a political conception of justice for a democratic society viewed as a system of fair cooperation between free and equal citizens who, as politically autonomous …, willingly accept the publicly recognized principles of justice specifying the fair terms of cooperation. However, the society in question is one in which there is diversity of comprehensive doctrines, all perfectly reasonable. This is the fact of reasonable pluralism … Now if all citizens are freely to endorse the political conception of justice, that conception must be able to gain the support of citizens who affirm different and opposing though reasonable comprehensive doctrines, in which case we have an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines (Rawls 1993, 24-25, note 27 ).
Thus we look away from comprehensive doctrines of individual citizens, we leave them behind the veil of ignorance and we look upon the thus created political liberalism as derived from a generally acceptable position:
This enables us to find a political conception of justice that can be the focus of an overlapping consensus and thereby serve as a public basis of justification in a society marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism (Rawls 1993, 25) .
Rawls claims that since we realize that some reasons valued by us will be not acceptable to some citizens, the fact of reasonable pluralism has to be excluded from the sphere of public reason in advance and only room for overlapping consensus should be left. Participants of the discussion should try to give reasons for their views and their actions, which others could not reasonably reject. By taking this step, Rawls limits the scope of topics and reasons to be discussed. Controversial questions are thus eliminated from the decisive political space beforehand.
10 Acceptability of opinions by others and the resulting stability wins priority over the criticism of a variety of forms of injustice. Limitation of the discussion to the acceptability of opinions in the eyes of citizens thus puts aside the critical dimension of public reason, i.e. the dimension which Rawls shifts to marginal debates because of his unbalanced differentiation between public and nonpublic spheres. The rejection of criticism and the solving of controversial problems, however, hides the problems which might become a source of conflicts and these need not be solved peacefully .
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The separation of citizens from the official public discourse leads to their alienation from the community and thus to a limiting of the legitimacy of the existing order, which consequently undermines the stability of the order which Rawls strives for. The main problem associated with this deficit is not, in my opinion, the maintenance of a frequently undesirable stability but misrecognition of citizens in terms of their participation in a democratic regime. This throws doubt on the securing of the very essence of democracy which consists in the anchoring of institutional discussions in parliament, the court of law and other institutions in the discussions of citizens and their life in society.
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The elimination of the culture of civic society and disputes about significant questions of society and policy and the exclusion of the media from public reason under the conditions of a mass media democracy lead to the fact that the accumulated tension between the official and "unofficial" public is discharged once in a while in the media-manipulated discussion, i.e. in pseudodiscourse (cf. Garnham 1999, 359-376; Dean 2001, 243-265; Sparks 2001) . Ed Baker studies the cultural and political role of the media and arrives at the understandable thesis that liberals, including Rawls, should recognize the membership of citizens in the community (or the so-called cultural structures that are deformed by the mass media) as primarily good and thus to give it a proper meaning in the theory as a whole (Baker 2002) .
Social Deficit
Rawls' idea of public reason is also the source of another deficit of political liberalism, the social deficit, which not only socially marginalizes citizens but also contributes to the limitation of their political participation. The core of the deficit becomes evident if we follow the shift in Rawls' interests that took place over the twenty years that passed between the publication of his first book A Theory of Justice (1971) and his second book Political Liberalism (1993) .
This shift is evident in Rawls' study "The idea of public reason revisited". Political Liberalism was launched by the publisher under the heading of the three "Rs": "Rawls Rethinks Rawls". What is the basis of this reformulation of Rawls' first book?
The aim of the theory of justice formulated by Rawls in his book A Theory of Justice was to articulate in a reflective and well-balanced way and justify the normative principles and procedures of a cooperative society which enables the just distribution of basic goods produced by society, and which its members make claim to. The theory is based on the contractualistic concept of the original position: free and equal people use their individual considerations to hypothetically conclude a social contract from behind the "veil of ignorance", without knowing anything about their own future social position and their talents and thus, independently of their personal interests, decide what principles should hold within society. Rawls suggests that in such a constitutional convention people would unanimously-we might say in reality as one person-first, prefer basic political and civil liberties and second, they would take into account the fact that they might find themselves in the worst social and economic position within society; therefore they would opt for the norms which would not do away with inequalities between people but would limit them. The fair conditions of the original position should thus bring analogously fair principles of justice.
Now we come to the two principles of justice as presented by Rawls in his first book. We know that the first principle, the principle of freedom, is about a set of equal fundamental political and civil freedoms, i.e. about formal equal political and civil liberties such as freedom of conscience and assembly, freedom of speech and to vote. The chief point of the second principle-the difference principle-concerns the equal distribution of the primary social goods. To be more precise, it deals with the potential difference or possible social inequalities between people, which are only justifiable as long as they are for the benefit of the leastadvantaged. These two principles are not equivalent, because as Rawls explicitly puts it, the first principle always has priority over the second, but both are an indispensable precondition for the social justice required in his Theory of Justice.
In contrast to the Theory of Justice, the situation seems different in his second book Political Liberalism and the work that followed. In Rawls' political-liberal conception of tolerance, the difference principle is marginalized, while the leading position of the principle of freedom is strengthened in this book. Susan Moller Okin claims that Rawls places a stronger emphasis on freedom and tolerance and plays down social-economic redistribution. She thinks that the priority of Rawls' principle of freedom gained a real "monopoly" (Okin 1993 (Okin , 1010 (Okin , 1011 . Brian Barry and other authors stress, like Okin, that the second principle has now been abandoned and even sacrificed (Barry 1995, 913; cf. Rawls 1999, 473-496) .
This criticism points to the reformulation of Rawls' social liberalism to liberalism without the 'social' attribute. If we see that liberalism defined solely by the first principle is in many ways compatible with right-wing libertarianism, it becomes evident that Rawls' reformulation is a transition to an entirely different political current. Although I am moving toward a similar conclusion, that conclusion cannot be drawn simply on the basis of the somewhat hurried argumentation worked out by the aforementioned critics of Rawls.
Reading Rawls' writings more carefully, it is possible to specify more precisely the themes analyzed and the way in which they have been elaborated. First, it has to be emphasized that the main subject of analysis in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism is not identical. This may cast doubt on the thesis about Rawls' reformulation of the approach to social justice in his second book. In the first book, the focus is on justice, while the second deals with the very different question of political legitimacy. The process of argumentation should then be as follows. First of all, justice as defined in A Theory of Justice presupposes the basic structure of society which is accompanied by the two principles of justice, including the socially oriented principle of difference. At this point, we can question the weakening of the meaning of the difference principle when discussing the issue of political legitimacy in Rawls' Political Liberalism.
Rawls maintains that political liberalism is a kind of view. … Accepting the idea of public reason and its principle of legitimacy emphatically does not mean, then, accepting a particular liberal conception of justice down to the last details …We agree that citizens share in political power as free and equal … yet we differ as to which principles are the most reasonable basis of public justification. The view I have called 'justice as fairness' is but one example of a liberal political conception; its specific content is not definitive of such a view" (Rawls 1993, 226) .
Rawls continues
Only a political conception of justice that all citizens might be reasonably expected to endorse can serve as a basis of public reason and justification (Rawls 1993, 137) .
This unveils the main concern of political liberalism, which is to endorse the idea of public reason and the related acceptability of the political regime as seen by its citizens. The key idea seems to be that the adequacy of the theory of justice is measured by the degree to which it is acceptable from the perspective of the overlapping consensus of the different opinions of the citizens (Rawls 1993, 229-230) . Political liberalism is then manifested in the application of the idea of public reason.
The principle of freedom, from the perspective of this application, appears to be acceptable, whereas Rawls sees the difference principle as problematically acceptable. Since Rawls perceives his theory of justice (as fairness) as one kind of political liberalism (Rawls 1993, 6, 223, 226) , it is solely the principle of freedom that other liberalisms also have in common. For that reason, in his general political-liberal conception in the second book, Rawls concerns himself with this principle alone. He claims that the difference principle does not belong to the constitutional basis and its supplements (Rawls 1993, 228-229) . 13 The principle of freedom is a precondition not only of justice but also of legitimacy, whereas the difference principle is only required as a basis of social justice. To simplify matters, political liberalism does not require social justice. While the principle of freedom is a prerequisite for the use of public reason in public discourse, the difference principle in Rawls' Political Liberalism is only one of the possible topics that can be discussed. All kinds of political liberalism are conceptions of justice and, for example, Nozick's libertarian theory of justice is from this point of view almost equally acceptable as Rawls' egalitarian liberal theory of justice.
Rawls thematized these views, though only secondarily, in his first book:
The first principle of equal liberty is the primary standard for the constitutional convention. … The second principle comes into play at the stage of the legislature. … Thus, the priority of the first principle of justice to the second is reflected in the priority of the constitutional convention to the legislative stage (Rawls 1971, 199) .
However, the authors who follow Rawls's theory have always emphasized-unjustifiablyits egalitarian dimension. The main thrust in Rawls' book Political Liberalism is not so much the reformulation of Rawls as presented by the editors of the book, Susan Okin, Brian Barry, and other commentators on Rawls. Rather, it is about the limits that were already present in A Theory of Justice and the pitfalls which were fully recognized only in Rawls' second book. Political liberalism does not require justice as fairness, or, legitimacy does not require (social) justice. The constraint on the social exclusion of some classes of citizens by the difference principle is just a possible option. However, Rawls' political liberalism does not require such an option. In contrast to many egalitarian liberals or critical theorists, Rawls does not regard some versions of non-egalitarian libertarianism as a nonviable political attitude, but as a position acceptable in the sphere of overlapping consensus.
